Begin Againbut With a Purpose This Time

Vladimir Putin's victory in the 2018 Russian presidential ballot was widely predicted. Every bit in the previous two elections, Putin non simply won the overall vote merely emerged triumphant in all 85 federal subjects of the country. He won 76.vii% of the vote  (the highest he has ever achieved) in an election that garnered a turnout of 67%.

While Putin'southward re-election was never in dubiety, the word buzzing around his administration in recent months has beenyavka (turnout). This has been the real point of contention for Putin, as well as for his opponents—and the question of turnout became all the more relevant for an election that took identify in the shadow of the Navalny ban. The other candidates: the millionaire 'communist' Grudinin, the xenophobic and vituperative Zhirinovsky, the TV-star socialite and political debutante Sobchak  take been little more than sideshows, but Navalny cut a more dangerous figure for the assistants.

Shadow-boxing with Navalny: the turnout question

More of an activist than a traditional politician, Navalny undertakes investigative journalism on his YouTube channel to shed light on the lavish lifestyles of prominent Russian figures, even flying drones over the estates of figures likeShuvalov,Solovyov andMedvedev. He frequently organizes street protests, which by and large are marked by confrontation with police force.

Since Navalny was barred from running due to embezzlement charges (that he vehemently denies), the name of the game for him has instead been to assault Putin's mandate. He has repeatedly motivated his followersnot to prove upwardly, operating under the proviso that if he can't trounce Putin, he tin can at to the lowest degree destabilize him.

This ballot, therefore, was never nearly by what margin Putin would win, but about whether or non the elections can be said to be genuinely representative of the volition of the people. This is why the assistants placed such focus on their '70–70' goal  (70% turnout, and lxx% of the vote for Putin). Putin crushed the lxx% vote target,  compared to his previous share of 65% in the 2012 elections. Though the turnout of 67% savage slightly short, information technology still compares favorably to the 65% from 2012.

For a President whose rallies pre-election lauded improving democracy, ensuring that those very autonomous processes that have legitimised his power were fully actualised was a serious concern. Falling short of this goal volition undoubtedly accept the event of emboldening Navalny and other grassroots anti-Putin activism, simply information technology may also provide grounds on which strange leaders can question the extent to which Putin truly represents his country.

And for quite a while during yesterday's election day it was looking similar Navalny's hopes would be realised and that the turnout would be an embarrassment for the administration. At 6pm Moscow fourth dimension the effigy was no higher than 59% ,  at which time (according to reports) state TV quite butstopped reporting the turnout statistics. When authorities did make a statement, it was topraise the high turnout in the overseas— a pocket-size fraction of the full electorate. Such a state of affairs is precisely what the administration wanted to avoid: Navalny's attempt to expose Putin's fragile mandate appeared to have some credence, and Western commentators rapidly jumped onthe turnout equally an avenue of criticism against Putin.

However, a surge of the numbers late at dark and early on in the morning saw turnout numbers increment dramatically. Although the lxx% goal was missed, the administration gladly accepted a turnout of 67%. In an election where the real opponent for Putin was aloofness, being able to increase the electorate from 2012 represents a existent success for Russia's current administration. It's a rhetoric that has been absent since the Soviet Union era.

In the USSR, only nigh everyone voted -  even though there was simply one party. Propaganda no uncertainty played its role, just election days had an atmosphere of festival and fanfare. Though they were elections without choice, people still saw voting as their ceremonious duty, a symbolic human activity rather than a political one. This year, taking a page out of the USSR's playbook, a culinary festival calledMos/Eda('Mos[cow]/Nutrient') provided food stalls at 1,500 voting locations in Moscow. About unbelievably, iPhones and iPads were offered every bit rewards inselfie contests at the ballot boxes. Balloons, calendars, stickers, pins and ice foam were freely given away.

'FOR THE SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND, FOR A HAPPY LIFE VOTES THE LIBERATED SOVIET Adult female!' CREDIT: RUSSIATREK

But the most alarming of the attempts to increase turnout was aviral video with a less-than-subtle homophobic undertones, in which diverse nightmarish scenarios play out for a man as well cynical to vote,  including a flamboyantly gay man filing his nails and suggestively eating a assistant in his kitchen, declaring that a recently-passed law now entitles him to motility in. (The origin of the video is notwithstanding not known.)

At that place take been speculations that this is besides why the decision to allow Ksenia Sobchak , a socialite whose family has shut ties to Putin,  to run in the ballot was tolerated. It is thought that she would increase turnout, especially amongst those likely to agree with Putin politically. The 2% of the vote that she received may be a tiny corporeality, but provided her voters were not defectors from Putin  (an unlikely proposition because their divergent platforms) this still represents a small but real contribution to turnout.

In the end, Putin's great margin of victory and tolerable turnout means that he received more than than 50% of the vote. In absolute numbers, the 56 1000000 votes he received is an increase of 10 million from 2012, and represents the virtually votes for any ane candidate in the history of the Russian Federation. No doubt the administration will be pleased with the 2018 elections.

And what and so of Navalny and his efforts to undermine Putin'south mandate? Information technology's likely that he is down just not out. His primary mission of keeping the turnout depression may accept failed, just irregularities in the elections volition provide him with an alternative angle of attack. Controversies about electoral procedures are get-go to surface: there take been emergingallegations of stuffed ballot boxes, videos of officialsgetting creative with the promotional balloonsto block surveillance cameras when the time came to count votes, too as bizarrereports of 99% turnout in the Chechen capital letter of Grozny, where observers were not present.

Combine this with the fact that Navalny himself,  the simply serious oppositional candidate, was barred from running under controversial allegations, then Navalny's statement that the elections do not truly represent the Russian people tin can be perceived as having some legitimacy. Nosotros tin can furthermore wait this to exist used as an avenue of criticism confronting Putin, both domestically as well equally on the international forepart. This is already underway among some pundits and Russian federation specialists, and is likely to crop up with some frequency as a means of undermining Putin.

We tin therefore anticipate the following debate: anti-Putin figures volition debate that in add-on to on-the-day irregularities, the field was skewed from the kickoff, that Sobchak was a Kremlin stooge, that state TV acted as Putin cheerleaders and that millions of government employees (and therefore dependents) were pressured into voting. Fifty-fifty if the pick was gratis,  something that not everyone is willing to concede,  the elections were not.

Meanwhile pro-Putin figures volition point to the fact that the upshot is so clear and overwhelmingly favourable to the President that the sheer margin of his victory by itself eradicates any doubts that may surround proceedings. It is difficult to argue that the greatest number of absolute votes e'er attained by a Russian candidate does not bring a clear mandate. A historic number of Russians not merely accept Putin as president, only in a year where fears of voter apathy were a consequent theme, also bothered to go out and bandage their votes for him.

Economic futures

While discussion in the next few weeks volition centre on the particulars of the election, such speculations are actually of slight relevance. The more interesting,  and more important,  bug now revolve effectually the question of:what next for Russian federation? Will Putin concur course, or will he use his next six years to have Russian federation in new directions? How will he run across the challenges facing Russia now? With which kind of advisors volition he surround himself? In the time that most media were busy scrutinising the drama of the election campaigns and personalities, much behind-the-scenes piece of work went into finding answers to these questions.

A crucial event in Russian politics will be the unveiling of the economical reform calendar and will likely have place in May, in one case Putin has appointed his full cabinet.

The Russian economic system faces budgetary problems. I have previouslywritten about Russia'due south enormous dependence on energy exports and the fragility this introduces to the economic system. The virtually serious of which is volatility. Oil and gas prices are the prime determinant of the health of the Russian economy. In fact virtually everything,  from GDP to stock market to ruble value, correlates with energy prices.

RUSSIAN Gdp Alter MIRRORS OIL PRICE Modify CLOSELY. CREDIT:BLOKHINA ET. AL.

The past few years accept been turbulent; energy prices decreased by as much as 77% between 2008 and 2016. The ruble also lost much of its value. In 2008, 1 United states$ bought 28 RUB; in 2016, it bought 75. Western sanctions on the banking and energy sectors reduced the ability (and willingness) of strange investors to place upper-case letter in the country. Both FDI and foreign debt took a hit.

The lucrative years preceding these troubles, withal, allowed Russian federation to accumulate wealth. Some of this was stored in its National Wealth Fund and other like 'rainy day' funds to exist used in case of future hardship and indeed take already been used in this capacity. These funds kept the Russian economy from destabilising in recent years. But the recent dependence on these funds has meant that they are perilously close to depletion. Of the several hundred billion dollars they once independent only almost twenty billion remain. This money is not merely intended to continue regions with deficits functional just likewise to safeguard of import social benefits, most notably pensions, the cipher that looms on the residuum canvas is crusade for alarm.

Every bit a result, the most important post-election event is likely to be the economic reform agenda. There have been few indications from the President regarding the direction he volition accept, but we do accept some ideas of what's going on behind the scenes.

Speaking to the St Petersburg International Economical Forum in 2017, Putin stressed the importance of digitalizing the economic system. He proposed increased funding for start-ups within fields like big data and AI, and even floated the idea of a virtual currency for the BRICS nations. In January of this twelvemonth, Putin told the Eurasian Economical Unionthat he believes "it is necessary to accelerate the Union's common digital calendar, coordinate deportment for advancing the Internet economic system [… and] to introduce high technologies into assistants, industrial production, custom regulations and other areas." Information technology's likely that the digital theme will be revisited by the President come May.

While expanding the technological sector and increasing diversification are welcome ideas, addressing weaknesses in the banking sector is arguably a more pressing matter. The government bailed out no fewer than four banks in 2017 due to mismanagement, peculiarly in the form of irresponsible expansion and an increased volume of bogus loans. This came as a blow to the Russian banking sector that is already in poor health. Public religion in private banks is low, and the five largest banks in the country are now state-endemic. Putin is aware of the trouble: in arecent accost to the Russian Federal Associates he declared that the financial assets that had been taken over from the banking sector "should be put on the market and sold without filibuster."

PRESIDENT PUTIN ADDRESSES THE FEDERAL Assembly, i MARCH 2018. CREDIT:NEWS-FRONT

It is about impossible to speak of the Russian economic system without speaking of energy, then this too volition nigh certainly be addressed. Energy still represents the majority of Russian exports also equally well-nigh half of the federal upkeep. Fortunately for Russian federation, experts anticipate that this market will remain relatively stable in the virtually future. Every bit Nord Stream 2 will ensure Russian energy export to Eu continues, the new front for Russia will be the Due east.

Only question marks hang over the futurity of hydrocarbon energy in a general sense. Though the2nd Sino-Russian oil pipeline became operational at the beginning of this year, China's thirst for oil is on the whole decreasing;  information technology is today the world's near innovative state within renewables. Considering free energy is the perennial question of the Russian economy, finding ways to address these challenges volition be essential in replenishing its National Wealth Fund.

Merely behind these arguments is curtained a boxing betwixt two schools of idea vying for influence over the coming economic agenda. On the one side is theStolypinsky Guild, named after the turn-of-the-century politician. Their members are by and large economists and businessmen from SEOs that together comprise a powerful grouping, yet one that has been neglected by Western media. Economically conservative, they prioritize stability and the maintenance of the status quo. On the other is the cadre of economic liberals spearheaded by Alexei Kudrin ,  a effigy who has been extensively covered in the West. A respected economist and bookish, his stint as Minister of Finance brought success on many fronts, including repayment of large amounts of strange debt ahead of schedule as well equally better than expected management of the post-2008 recession.

Kudrin and his associates volition strive for decentralization in a bid to improve the investment climate. They contend that the prominence of SEOs at the detriment of SMEs and other individual companies deters strange investors, whereas a lower degree of government intervention would accept the opposite effect. Similar Putin, Kudrin has stressed the importance of the digital sector. Just different Putin, he has claimed thatgovernment subsidies hinder rather than aid its evolution. Kudrin has also advocated for increased spending on healthcare and pedagogy, both of which were cut in favor of pensions and are in a relatively poor country. The justification for this is that should people alive longer and work with an expanded skill ready, the positive outcome this would have on the economy would more than recoup the costs. In the short-term, even so, he proposes these reforms exist financed by cut military expenditure — something which has increased every year since 1998.

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY BUDGET IS ON THE Ascent. CREDIT: WIKIMEDIA

And therein nosotros notice a trouble with his economic liberalism. Ideas of devolution of ability from Moscow and reduced military machine expenditure are not pop with those who like to see Russia as a potent state with a decisive leader in the Kremlin and a powerful military to kicking. This is the perspective championed by the Stolypinsky Club. They regard Kudrin and his plan as rocking the boat a little too dangerously. They prioritize maintaining the established economical arrangement under something of a 'if it own't broke' slogan. They allege that Kudrin's proposed reforms will be too aggressive, have unforeseen consequences, and may lead to social discontentment with the government.

While Kudrin wishes to reduce the role of SEOs, Boris Titov (the Commissioner for Entrepeneurs' Rights and key Stolypinsky Club fellow member) argues for even greater SEO interest. And while Kudrin seeks to make Russian federation a friendlier habitation for foreign investment, Titov prefers that the investment come from the government itself. Co-ordinate tothe Stolypinsky Social club'due south economical strategy, reduced governmental expenditure will reduce growth — but if this were increased, it would enhance the regime'due south chapters to protect national interests. To facilitate this, their economic strategy seeks reduced interest rates and higher aggrandizement, assuasive SEOs to invest more heavily in national industries by taking on more debt.

The fact that near of the members of the Stolypinsky Club are representatives of large Russian corporations, and the fact that they have the back up of the bulk of Russia's oligarchs, may compromise their objectivity. Yet, by the same token, such prominent positions besides allow them considerable influence.

Which model will prevail remains to be seen. Kudrin's rails record is impressive and his reputation is solid. What's more, he is associated with a Putin-friendly network that includes the Sobchak family unit  and such informal connections are valued in the high echelons of Russian power.

At that place have long been speculations that Kudrin may fifty-fifty sally the new Prime Minister to replace Medvedev. Should this happen, information technology volition exist a articulate indication of which direction Putin is minded to take. On the other hand, information technology is not hard to imagine that Putin, whose economic outlook has always prioritized stability and viewed economics every bit means to political ends, would marshal with the Stolypinsky Club'southward perspective that Kudrin's reforms are also radical.

A personal prognostication would be that Putin will opt for a middle-of-the-road approach, finding a compromise between the two factions. Adopting some elements of 'Program 1000' — every bit the full corpus of Kudrin'south propositions are known — while all the same ensuring continued governmental support for industries is probable.

Such a synthesis of the two camps would allow Putin to implement reforms designed to improve diversification, stimulate the digital sector and increase FDI, but without losing the support of the powerful financial figures whose appeasement is and then vital in ensuring the state'due south equable governance. On the domestic front, Putin'due south arguably greatest force every bit a leader is his skill in keeping all the diverse interests of the various Russian nabobs from clashing in a too ugly manner. For that reason it is non unlikely that we will see an economic programme that reconciles tenets from both sides of the argument.

VLADIMIR PUTIN SPEAKS WITH BORIS TITOV. CREDIT: KREMLIN

Strategic futures

Behind-the-scenes ability struggles are not express to the economic sector. The history of Russian federation'due south many and powerful security servicesare riddled with such contests. At nowadays, however, we find ourselves in the midst of an especially important one. In that location have been hints that Putin will seek to restructure his security and intelligence agencies, and of the almost meaning developments to sentry out for in this term will be how he goes about this.

Putin, a one-time KGB homo, has made the security services an integral function of his system of governance. Afterwards successfully reducing the power that oligarchs held in Russian federation, he proceeded to fill the void with more and more than of his lieutenants from the security services. The worldview of suchsiloviki(politicians with a background in security, military or intelligence)  typically runs along side a 'siege mentality'.

To contemplate the situation from Putin's perspective, Russia'southward enemies are many, their discontent it growing and their techniques are condign increasingly sophisticated. The color revolutions show this. Russian federation, therefore, must take steps to protect itself, not only from external subversion, but also to deter any demoralization that may fester on domestically. To facilitate this, thesilovikiaccept gradually been given a greater share of ability.

It has been the FSB from which the well-nigh such figures have been drafted, and which has seen its jurisdiction enhanced the nearly. The FSB'due south ability is extensive, being involved in virtually every sector imaginable: military operations, counter-intelligence, university campuses, economic affairs, anti-corruption, banking, so on. Even though it may seem that the FSB'due south large remit may squeeze out all competition, at that place is in fact a conflict brewing backside the scenes in which Russia's various security and intelligence services are vying with 1 other for greater admission to resource and power.

The FSB's emerging rival is the Rosgvardiya,the National Guard. While the FSB is the inheritor of the KGB and therefore comes from a long line of Russian security services, the National Baby-sit is a very contempo institution, having been founded by Putin in 2016 from the remnants of the Internal Troops of Russia, a paramilitary force previously under Internal Affairs. Information technology may exist significantly younger, only its 340,000 employees hateful it is already bigger than the FSB, which is estimated to take somewhere between 200,000 and 290,000 employees.

What is unique about the Rosgvardiya is that information technology is independent and directly subordinate to Putin. It has powers equivalent of a ministry building, pregnant that it reports to the President solitary. Clues for its purpose can exist found in its genesis. Its existence was primarily motivated by two factors: the regional governors who failed to pay federal taxes and needed to be removed, and the increase in street protests which needed to be concise. (It's had more than than a few run-ins with Navalny's demonstrations).

We may surmise, therefore, that Putin intends the Rosgvardiya to act every bit his personal guarantors of loyalty from other political figures, too as a means tominimize civil unrest. The fact that Putin appointed his long-time head of personal protection, as well as judo sparring partner,  Viktor Zolotov to lead the Rosgvardiya suggests that Putin intends to use the service as anadvertising hoc personal Praetorian Baby-sit.

VIKTOR ZOLOTOV AND VLADIMIR PUTIN. CREDIT: AP

But mayhap Putin's intentions for the National Guard are greater however. In spite of its short existence Rosgvardiya's jurisdiction is surprisingly widespread, and is even so growing. Whereas it initially only trained within its own premises, it has been permitted to acquit out exercises in Russian cities in training for responding to localized threats. It also is likely to receive under its command several factions of special police. The National Guard will also receive duties inside the realm of cyber security and intelligence, including the surveillance of social media for terrorist or other extremist agitation. It is not impossible to imagine that their responsibilities within cyber will expand beyond being merely observational.

Suspicions that Putin's confidence in the FSB is on the wane might explain this transfer of power. He is said to be sceptical of the organisation's competence after its inability to prevent the St Petersburg metro bombings, the basis it ceded to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, its poor intelligence with reference to Ukraine and in particular its failure to anticipate Western sanctions.

The FSB is naturally troubled by this, and sees the National Guard's augmentation of ability equally encroaching on a role that had always been reserved for them. Overseeing regional politicians' security (likewise as ensuring they don't stray also far from the fold) and cyber operations were previously entirely inside the FSB'due south domain. Until now the FSB has never shared these duties with whatever other agency.

Although piddling has been written almost this in Western media, the event of this conflict betwixt the Rosgvardiya and the FSB play out will be one of the most important things to scout in Putin's upcoming term. The reason this particular conflict is so of import is that this is no usual ability struggle.

There has beena practiced deal of speculationthat Putin is seeking to found a 'super' security agency by centralizing a host of smaller agencies under one designation, rumored to be titled the Ministry building of State Security (MGB). This would be the 2d fourth dimension such a ministry has existed: Stalin oversaw a short-lived but no less feared intelligence agency under that name.

It is not known which existing security services, intelligence agencies, or special forces might be incorporated into the MGB, only it is likely that it would include the heavyweights of Russian security, and its remit would certainly include operations both inside the country and without. Should it exist instated, it would stand for a major battleground on which the disharmonize betwixt the FSB and the Rosgvardiya will play out. Attaining pole position in such a powerful body would signify a pre-eminent part in the execution of the land's loftier-priority security and intelligence questions. And since Putin is the country'south sole determination maker when information technology comes to foreign policy, existence his primary source of intelligence signifies an enormously powerful position.

THE LUBYANKA Building, HOME OF SECURITY SERVICES FROM THE CHEKA TO THE FSB. CREDIT: LE MONDE

This ways that there is a possibility that whichever agency receives Putin's vote of confidence could achieve a snowball effect where their power continues to augment at the detriment of the other. Only even if there is no MGB coming, the fallout from this dispute -  over what powers the two competing security agencies volition contend, how Putin will position himself relative to the two of them, whether one agency will emerge ascendant or if they will strike an uneasy rest - will be vital to the hereafter of Russia's power structures, and is something that should be carefully observed in the following months.

Après Putin, le déluge

In 2008 the Russian presidential term was extended from four to six years, pregnant that we will see Putin retain the presidency until 2024. What happens subsequently that, nonetheless, is anyone'south guess.

At the end of this term, Putin volition be 71 years old. Another term would brand him 77. Although his practiced health may allow him to serve yet another term, the Russian constitution would prevent such an occurrence from happening. Under its manufactures, no President may serve more than ii terms consecutively.

However Putin tin circumvent this in i of 2 ways. The first is to repeat what he did in 2008–2012 and serve equally Prime Government minister while passing the presidency to a trusted figure, later on which he will be eligible for the presidency once again. But to repeat such a manoeuvre in the hereafter would mean calculation 6 years to the calculation. Alternatively, he may simply improve the constitution to allow himself to keep to remain president, even afterward two consecutive terms.

Both of these scenarios are unlikely, and it looks every bit though Putin will end his presidential run after 2024. Therefore, the question everyone in Russian politics: is gearing towards  (but which no ane has nevertheless dared broach in a serious mode)  is who will be next? At present, predicting the next President is a near impossible task. Though names like Vaino, Oreshkin, Shoygu and even Medvedev have come, no one figure stands out as a natural successor. And it is important to think that whenYeltsin asked Putin to succeed him, Putin was not specially well known and his date was largely unexpected.

Finding a replacement for Putin ways finding someone who tin can fill his shoes. This means that his replacement must not just have to have the aforementioned skill in the political game as Putin possesses, but also to be a qualitatively similar leader. The W often decries the authoritarian nature of the Russian administration and hankers for another Gorbachev, but the truth is that Russia is at its nearly secure with a strongman-type at the captain. Indeed information technology would seem about impossible for such an incomparably vast country to be governed by any other means, without it devolving into a series of increasingly independent federations. Whether ane agrees or disagrees with this model is neither hither nor there, information technology is non the ane pursued by the Kremlin, nor desired by the Russian people.

Putin understands that this is his appeal. His official entrada slogan makes no bones about it.Sil'nyy Prezident - sil'naya Rossiya (strong President -Strong Russia) is a directly appeal to the Russian image of an idol leader, one who knows how to stand up to strange powers on behalf of the motherland. This is an electorate whose approval for him increased sharply after his actions in Crimea. It is also an electorate whose patriotism is and so corking that many Russians will tolerate worse living conditions if it ways they are reassured that it enables Russia to stand up its ground more competently on the world stage.

A CAMPAIGN BILLBOARD OF PUTIN, INSCRIBED WITH HIS Campaign SLOGAN. CREDIT: AFP

Putin's successor must be a figure that is able to fulfil such an image. At present, withal, it seems no one is being conditioned to fulfil this part. In that location is also the 2nd claiming, which is the transition. The end of the Putin era will be a hugely significant even in Russian and world politics. As the arrangement of governance that Putin oversees and manages comes to an finish, no small-scale corporeality of political heavyweights volition fence for more powerful positions. Ensuring that the transition to a new leader retains stability in the country will therefore exist a vital concern.

There accept even been those that theorize that, with challenges like these, Putin may quite simply find it easier to remain President For Life. However, this also seems unlikely. Putin indicated afterward his victorythat he has no desire to "sit until [he's] a hundred years old." It seems more likely that we will witness a connected political appointment from Putin, but in a more diminutive role. Possibilities include a place in the Country Quango or Speaker of the Duma, the Russian parliament. Such positions as a kind oféminence grisewould make fewer demands of him, but still allow him to exert influence over the direction of Russia,  besides as his ain legacy. He would no longer occupy the total limelight by himself, but even so be in a position to ease the transition to a new leader and reduce the dubiousness that will accompany his departure every bit president.

In whatsoever case, at this point in time, Putin's future is up in the air. We tin can do no more but approximate. Therefore any signs of a new figure beingness groomed to assume presidential responsibilities volition be one of the key things to sentry out for in the coming years. Indeed  it will probably exist in the middle to later on stages of the upcoming term that nosotros showtime seeing signs of a replacement. Earlier so, nevertheless, we must wait and see how Putin chooses to bargain with the two pressing matters that face him now: the futurity of the Russian economy, and the hereafter of the security services that form a crucial colonnade of the Russian power system.

At that place is fifty-fifty a possibility that the fashion he approaches these issues will provide indications of what kind of successor is to come. Will he steer Russia towards Kudrin and orthodox economic liberalism, or towards Titov and the status quo of established interests? Towards Zolotov and greater roles for personal confidants, or towards the FSB and the traditional systems ofsilovikiability? All such choices signify a specific vision for Russia, and that a possible successor might be representative of that vision. It is articulate that nosotros yet don't know much about what the next 6 years have in store, merely what is clear is that the answers that this term brings volition be a key force in shaping Russia's hereafter, as well as Putin's legacy.

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FEATURED Photograph: VLADIMIR PUTIN THANKS HIS SUPPORTERS.PHOTO CREDIT: Kremlin Editors annotation: The opinions expressed hither by Impakter.com columnists are their own, not those of Impakter.com

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Source: https://impakter.com/putin-wins-whats-different-time/

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